Employment Assimilation of Immigrants in the Netherlands: Catching Up and the Irrelevance of Education by Zorlu, Aslan & Hartog, Joop
IZA DP No. 3534
Employment Assimilation of Immigrants




























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
June 2008 
Employment Assimilation of Immigrants 
in the Netherlands: Catching Up and the 




















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 













Employment Assimilation of Immigrants in the Netherlands: 
Catching Up and the Irrelevance of Education
*
 
Using two Dutch labour force surveys, employment assimilation of immigrants is examined. 
We observe marked differences between immigrants by source country. Non-western 
immigrants never reach parity with native Dutch. Even second generation immigrants never 
fully catch up. Caribbean immigrants, who share a colonial history with the Dutch, assimilate 
relatively quick compared to other non-western immigrants but they still suffer from high 
unemployment. The study also documents that the quality of jobs is significantly lower for 
immigrants, especially for those who are at larger cultural distance to Dutch society. Job 
quality of immigrants increases with the duration of stay but again, does not reach parity with 
natives. The western immigrants seem to face no considerable difficulties in the Dutch labour 
market. The most remarkable conclusion is the irrelevance of education for socio-economic 
position of immigrants once the country of origin has been controlled for. 
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* The research was based on collaboration with Statistics Netherlands. We are grateful to Henk-Jan Dirven. 1. Introduction 
Europe is gearing up for a new stage in its migration history. In the post-war period, after 
accommodating migration flows following the war upheaval and the decolonisation era, large 
numbers of low-skilled immigrants entered the north-western European labour markets. When 
the long post-war boom period ended, these flows were cut off, but family formation and re-
unification kept entry at substantial levels. During the ‘90’s, refugees massively knocked on 
the door; admission rates initially were substantial, but later this inflow was also severely 
restricted. Immigration of guest workers and their relatives and of refugees has left the 
countries in North West Europe with large populations with a disadvantaged socio-economic 
position. For several decades now, governments have sought policies to integrate these 
immigrants (and their offspring) smoothly into society, with little visible success. The new 
policy interest is in acquiring high skilled immigrants to boost the international competitive 
position. In the meantime, the European Union (EU) has opened up labour markets ever 
further; labour mobility between the old EU countries, with labour forces of comparable 
qualification structure, is free, immigration from the new EU members, with sometimes quite 
different level and distribution of qualifications, is also completely free or will soon be so. 
Thus, policy attention concentrates on integrating the stock of unskilled “old” immigrant 
groups, on shifting from low skilled to high skilled new immigrants (who presumably 
assimilate much more easily and smoothly than the old unskilled groups) and on coping with 
immigrants from the new EU members.   
One might define successful integration or assimilation
1 as the situation where an ethnic 
group that is observationally equivalent to native-born citizens is also observationally 
equivalent in socio-economic outcomes (employment rate, earnings, job quality). A useful 
tool to study this is the Dip&Catch-up model: immigrants enter at a disadvantage relative to 
comparable natives because they lack host country specific skills, but they will catch up 
because of their strong incentives to invest in these skills. We will use this model to assess the 
position of immigrant groups in The Netherlands.  
The Netherlands has experienced the standard European history sketched above and we have 
an interesting though still imperfect dataset.  The Dip& Catch up model has been developed 
and mostly applied in the United States, almost exclusively focused on earnings. We will 
extend the range of application of this model beyond earnings profiles of male immigrants 
(Chiswick 1978, Borjas, 1985, 1995; Friedberg 2000) and also estimate the assimilation 
pattern of immigrant women
2 and we will go beyond wages. Looking only at wages implicitly 
assumes that immigrant labour market assimilation takes place predominantly through wages 
and access to employment is self-evident. Such an assumption may perhaps apply to the US 
labour market but it is less relevant for northern and western European countries with a less 
flexible labour market and a generous welfare system.  
In European labour markets, labour market participation is an important issue in immigrant 
assimilation because especially immigrants from non-western countries have dramatically low 
participation and high unemployment rates. A small number of studies show that non-western 
immigrants experience an initial employment disadvantage and that the assimilation pattern of 
immigrants varies by the country of origin (Bevelander and Nielsen, 2001; Wheatley Price, 
2001; Hartog and Zorlu, forthcoming; Amuedo-Dorentes and de la Rica, 2007). The low 
                                                 
1 We do not want to engage in disputes over terminology or definition of integration versus assimilation etc. We 
take our definition as simply reflecting a policy goal.   
2 Labour market assimilation of immigrant women has been studied in  only a very limited number of studies 
(see for instance  Adsera and Chiswick 2007; Schoeni 1998)  
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mechanism and also as a source of poor integration of migrants in social, cultural and political 
domains of society although a reverse causality cannot be excluded. Therefore, immigrants’ 
labour market performance is at the heart of public debate in the Netherlands, like in other 
European countries.  
Labour market disadvantage of immigrants systematically is not restricted to employment 
status. It appears also in the segment of employment. A concentration of immigrants in 
particular types of employment, occupations and sectors has consequences for the quality of 
their jobs, earnings, employability and correspondingly career prospects. However, little is 
known about the assimilation pattern of immigrants by job type and we will contribute new 
evidence on this issue. 
This study examines employment and occupational assimilation of male and female migrants 
in the Netherlands with an emphasis on the duration of residence, using the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 2004 and 2005. LFS contains no information on wages and household income 
but includes detailed information on characteristics of employment. Therefore, this study 
estimates reduced form probabilities of employment and unemployment, rather than 
modelling labour supply behaviour. Occupational assimilation is approximated by ceteris 
paribus immigrant mobility into better jobs. The job quality is assessed by the Erikson-
Goldthorpe-Portocarero social class scheme (EGP), which has been derived from a number of 
factors like income, economic security, likelihood of promotion, position in production 
relations, power relations in the production process and the degree of autonomy. This paper is 
the first in the Netherlands studying employment assimilation of migrants over time.  
Using cross-section data is admittedly a methodological drawback because the analysis 
cannot properly deal with possible changes in quality of immigration cohorts, selective return 
migration and variation in economic conditions. However, the use of cross section data can be 
justified with two main arguments. The first is a simple but solid restriction: the absence of 
suitable longitudinal data
3. The second one is a more intuitive assumption on quality of 
immigration cohorts and selective return migration of non-western immigrants. We argue that 
the country of origin is a good predictor of immigrant quality  and that selective return 
migration is modest for non-western migrants because the return migration rate of these 
migrants itself is very low and return is often not voluntary. Since a large part of immigration 
from main source countries to the Netherlands has occurred as family migration, no 
significant variation in educational composition of subsequent immigration flows within this 
category is expected. This may be less relevant for asylum migrants who come from a variety 
of countries. Regular changes in the composition of source countries can affect ‘quality’ of 
asylum migrants because education level of migrants varies across the countries of origin 
(Hartog and Zorlu, forthcoming).   
This study identifies varying assimilation patterns for the major groups of migrants in the 
Netherlands for the first time. Turkish and Moroccan immigrants start with a low activity rate 
and predominantly low quality jobs and improve their position significantly with the duration 
of stay but they cannot catch up with natives. Caribbean immigrants face even a lower activity 
rate upon arrival but the quality of their jobs is relatively high. This group improves its 
position sharply over time and almost catches up with natives. Particular high performance of 
Caribbean women is notable. Asylum migrants suffer from complex admittance procedures 
and experience a long ‘take off’ period and remain far behind other immigrants. The study 
also evidences that Western migrants face no significant difficulties in the labour market.   
                                                 
3 We have longitudinal data on labour market position but information on education is not included.  
  32. Origins of the immigrant population  
Immigration to the Netherlands followed a common European sequence characterised by 
post-war and post-colonial restructuring, recruitment of unskilled guest workers and arrival of 
refugees in large numbers. In the Netherlands, decolonisation refers to Indonesia (1949) and 
Surinam or Dutch Guyana (1975). The first decolonisation generated two major immigration 
waves from Indonesia between 1949-1951 and between 1952-1957 and a relatively smaller 
immigration in the early 1960s. The decolonisation of Surinam also led to two large 
immigration flows, in the year of decolonisation (1975) and between 1979-1980. Integration 
of Indonesian immigrants has been relatively smooth. However, Surinamese migrants have 
still a disadvantaged position and so are immigrants from the Dutch Antilles. 
The flow of ‘guest workers’ started in the beginning of the 1960s, predominantly from Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco and Yugoslavia. Many immigrants from Italy, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece have returned home as these countries have integrated in the 
European Union while immigration from Turkey and Morocco kept growing due to the inflow 
of spouses, children and brides of these predominantly male workers despite increasingly 
tighter immigration policy.  
In the end, Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans have become the largest migrant 
groups in the Netherlands. Immigrants from (former) colonies (Surinamese, Antilleans) are 
familiar with Dutch society and often speak the language while Turks and Moroccans have a 
different religious and cultural background, and often have very poor command of the Dutch 
language; new and old immigrants are now required to learn Dutch. . 
During the 1990’s, immigration flows were dominated by asylum migrants from among 
others former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and China. Further 
tightening of immigration policies in the beginning of 2000’s has hindered asylum migration 
as well as family migration from Turkey and Morocco substantially. At the same time, the 
extension of the European Union with eastern European countries has generated a legal 
ground for immigration from these countries although the immigration from these countries is 
not yet completely free and subject to controls according to the perceived need for immigrant 
labour. 
In addition to the immigrant population from non-western countries, the Netherlands hosts a 
large number of immigrants from the European Union countries and from other developed 
countries like the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. All these immigrants are 
categorised as Western immigrants. They enter the Netherlands as labour migrants and 
perform even slightly better than natives in the labour market. The stock of these immigrants 
does not change very much due to migration flows that are highly sensitive to business cycles.  
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
This study uses Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from Statistics Netherlands. To retain more 
observations on immigrants, we pool LFS’s from 2004 and 2005; we restrict the sample to 
people aged 25 to 64 years who are not in full-time education. LFS contains information 
about education in addition to a large number of other variables. However, no distinction is 
made between education acquired in the home country or in the Netherlands. This raises some 
doubt about measurement error when foreign education has been translated to the standard 
education classification in the Netherlands (see Hartog and Zorlu, forthcoming). 
Considering similarities in starting conditions in the labour market, immigrants are clustered 
into 6 groups. The first group (TurkMoroc) contains Turkish and Moroccan immigrants 
whose labour market positions are very similar in time. Immigrants from Dutch Antilles and 
the former colony Suriname are pooled into the second category (Caribbean). The third group 
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Iraqi and Afghani immigrants who have often significantly contributed to refugee flows into 
the Netherlands. Other non-western migrants are aggregated into the fifth group (NW) that 
also includes other refugees. Immigrants from western countries are clustered into the 
category (Western). 
Differences in labour market positions are likely due to differences in human capital 
endowments and demographic characteristics of the groups. Table 1 presents mean values of 
dependent variables (employment and unemployment) and covariates for natives and the 
immigrant sub-samples.   
Employment probabilities of the immigrant groups are in general lower than for natives while 
their unemployment and inactivity rates are relatively high. Striking are the substantially 
lower employment and higher unemployment probabilities for the group of Asylum migrants 
which consists of relatively newly arrived immigrants. The share of second generation in this 
group is negligible. Also the activity rate of Turkish and Moroccan migrants (TurkMoroc) is 
significantly lower, especially for women although this group has a long migration history 
and a higher share of the second generation. Eastern European migrants (East) and 
immigrants from other non-western countries (NW) have lower activity rates than natives. 
Employment rates of Caribbean migrants and especially western migrants are the most similar 
to those of natives.  Notably, the unemployment rate is particularly high for immigrants from 
non-western countries while western immigrants enjoy a relatively low unemployment rate.   
It is immediately apparent that the demographic and educational characteristics of Western 
immigrants are similar to natives. Other immigrant groups have a younger age structure and 
their educational distribution is characterized by significant inter-group differences. 
TurkMoroc has the lowest education level with a high concentration in the lowest category 
while asylum immigrants have a bipolar distribution with relatively large concentrations in 
the lowest and highest categories.  
Immigrants, but especially non-western immigrants are relatively young and more often lower 
educated on average. They have more often children aged below 12 years. Interestingly, the 
share of immigrants from Western, NW and Asylum having a university education is higher 
than for natives. As indicated by the mean values of years since migration (YSM), western 
immigrants have the lowest duration of stay in the Netherlands, which can be largely 
explained by a high turn over rate (return migration); western immigration is not a recent 
feature.  Refugees, however, are the most recent immigrants, together with a large number of 
Eastern European immigrants. Almost all refugees in our data arrived after 1990. Hence, their 
durations of stay are less than 15 years.   
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  M e n           
 
W o m e n       
  Native  TurkM Car  East Ref NW west NativeTurkM Car East Ref NW  west
Employed  0.85  0.68 0.78 0.73 0.49 0.72 0.80  0.67 0.35 0.65 0.55 0.22 0.50 0.65
Unemployed 0.04  0.18  0.16  0.14 0.29 0.18 0.06  0.05 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.06
Age  44.79  38.86 41.37 42.77 40.4840.7146.00 44.64 37.0841.2341.04 38.76 39.58 45.36
Second  gen    0.15 0.28 0.24 0.01 0.11 0.74   0.19 0.24 0.15 0.01 0.10 0.70
YSM    16.05 15.23 10.06  8.8812.87 6.06   14.6215.7610.31 8.20  11.95 6.46
Education 13.43  10.77  12.52 13.62 13.3712.6313.63 12.85 9.5612.2613.43 11.92 12.06 13.10
Married    0.56  0.56 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.57 0.54  0.53 0.51 0.44 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.50
1 Child 0-5yr  0.12  0.30  0.16 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.12  0.12 0.30 0.17 0.19  0.27 0.23 0.13
2+  child  0-5yr  0.08  0.14 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.07
Child 6-11yr  0.19  0.38  0.18  0.20 0.26 0.25 0.17  0.20 0.44 0.26 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.19
Full-time  0.76  0.60 0.70 0.66 0.39 0.62 0.71  0.16 0.13 0.28 0.20 0.07 0.21 0.19
Hours 24-32  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06  0.20 0.09 0.22 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.20
Naturalised (Imm)   0.19  0.90 0.16 0.07 0.36 0.37    0.17 0.86 0.19 0.05 0.34 0.39
                      
N  61333  1728  1160 522 410 971 5333  62136 1716 1549 851 285  1278  5829
 
4. The limitations of cross section data 
Using cross-section data is potentially subject to methodological drawbacks because the 
analysis cannot properly deal with possible changes in quality of immigration cohorts, 
selective return migration and changes in economic conditions that have lasting effects. We 
use cross section data simply because longitudinal data without information on education are 
not suitable. But we will argue that in our case the drawbacks are probably not serious.   
Change in immigrant quality over time is a big issue in 
the US debate over catching-up (or different relative 
performance of more recent cohorts of immigrants). We 
doubt whether this is an issue as long as we distinguish 
immigrants by origin country. To get a first impression of 
observable cohort quality, we conduct a simple analysis to 
understand changes in education level of subsequent 
immigration cohorts. The descriptive analysis, shown by 
figure 1, indicates that the skill level of immigrants from 
Turkey and Morocco, and other non-western countries has 
increased particularly in the last 10 to 15 years while the 
skill level of Caribbean and asylum migrants has 
fluctuated in time to decline in the last 10 years. Further, a 
steady increase in the overall skill level of western 
immigrants and a rise in the share of medium skilled 
immigrants from Eastern Europe are striking.  
Since education levels have significantly increased in the 
Netherlands in the post World War period, as well as in 
most source countries, any increase in the education level of subsequent immigration cohorts 
does not necessarily imply an increase in the relative cohort quality. Ideally, we need to 
compare the age-specific skill distributions of natives and immigrants to account for possible 
changes in the cohort quality.  However, it is hard to measure true age-specific skill 
distributions of immigration cohorts recursively from the cross-sectional data, as return 
migration may be selective (but see below) and in particular because sample sizes are small. 
To obtain some indication, we regress years of education on age and YSM in the whole 
Educational distribution by YSM and origin























































  6sample to see relative skill levels. Subsequently, we repeat this exercise for the separate origin 
countries. The results in table 2 confirm the descriptive results after controlling age and 
gender: an increase in the skill level of immigrants from Turkey/Morocco and other non-
western and western countries, and a declining skill level for asylum seekers. The pattern for 
second generation immigrants is remarkable: an increase for some source countries, a decline 
for others.  
Of course the real problem is change in unobserved quality. Some of the relevant unobserved 
qualities no doubt correlate with education and this will restrain the bias in the estimated 
effect of YSM. 
Table 2. Regression analysis of education 
 ALL  Nativ  TurkM Car Eur Refug othnw West 
   Coef.     t Coef.      t Coef.     t Coef.     t Coef.     t Coef.     t Coef.     t Coef.    t
Woman -0.59 -36.0 -0.58  -33.0 -1.37 -11.8 -0.21 -1.7 -0.31 -1.7 -1.21 -4.2 -0.56 -3.5 -0.58 -9.4
Age 0.02 3.3 0.01  1.0 0.05 1.0 0.19 3.4 0.06 0.8 0.42 3.2 0.21 2.9 0.13 5.0
age2 0.00 -11.4 0.00  -8.9 0.00 -2.8 0.00 -3.7 0.00 -1.1 0.00 -2.9 0.00 -3.2 0.00 -6.4
YSM 0.15 5.9   -0.13 -4.1 -0.06 -1.9 -0.04 -1.0 0.27 3.2 -0.11 -3.4 -0.08 -5.0
YSM2 0.00 3.1   0.00 4.4 0.00 3.0 0.00 0.4 -0.01 -2.0 0.00 3.6 0.00 3.4
gen2nd 0.13 1.2   1.07 3.8 1.16 3.9 -1.10 -3.1 3.65 2.5 1.34 3.9 -1.25 -7.5
TurkMoroc -2.39 -19.4                       
Caribbean -0.99 -7.6                       
East-Europ 0.20 1.4                       
Refugee   -2.06 -8.4                       
Non-western -0.84 -6.7                       
Western 0.20 1.9                       
TurkMoroc*YSM -0.23 -9.0                       
Caribbean*YSM -0.16 -6.5                       
East-Europ*YSM -0.16 -6.0                       
Refugee*YSM                              
Non-west*YSM -0.18 -7.0                       
Western*YSM -0.17 -6.8                       
Constant 14.26 97.8 14.61 94.21 12.01 11.59 8.76 7.62 13.52 8.72 2.14 0.81 9.17 6.24 13.03 23.07
  
R-squared 0.06 0.045  0.15 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.04
N 145089 123469  3434 2709 1373 695 2249 11160
 
Selective return migration for our purpose is to some extent a matter of interpretation. With 
our data we estimate the effect of years since migration on socio-economic outcomes. 
Outcomes are only observed for immigrants that have not left. If emigration of immigrants is 
not random, the estimated profile is a biased estimate of the effect of being exposed to or 
engaged in the host country economy. If the effect of exposure per se is zero, the estimated 
profile will only show the differences between immigrants still around after t years and those 
still around after t+1 years. With negatively selected emigration, the profile will slope 
upwards (more successful immigrants stay), with positively selected emigration the profile 
will slope downwards (the less successful stay). Schmidt (1997) notes that in Germany 
between 1950 and 1990, 11 million guest-workers entered from the six primary source 
countries, while their net immigration over this periods was only 2 million. With such intense 
outmigration of immigrants, the question of selectivity is of foremost importance.   
Research on selectivity in return migration is not abundant. Edin, Lalonde and Aslund (2000) 
analyse a 3 % sample of immigrants to Sweden in the period 1970-1990. Among Nordic 
immigrants, 44% emigrate within 5 years, among OECD immigrants 31% and among non-
OECD immigrants 10%. Emigration patterns obey a standard profile (cf Hartog and 
Winkelmann, 2004): a marked increase in the first years after arrival, and then a long decline, 
with emigration generally peaking between 2 and 4 years after arrival. Judged from the 
  7situation in the first year after arrival, emigration is not selective in earnings, but there is 
negative selection in employment. However, correcting earnings growth over a period of 10 
years after arrival reduces the growth rate by 86%, 120% and 21% resp for  Nordic, OECD 
and non-OECD immigrants, respectively.  
We know that immigrants to the Netherlands do not stay forever. From 1995 to 2001, 658 000 
persons born outside the Netherlands immigrated; 142 000, or 22% of them had left again by 
2001. The pattern we observe for the oldest cohort (1995 immigrants), in Figure 1, is also 
visible in later cohorts. Six years after arrival, about a third of the immigrants have left again.  
 






























 Source: Hartog and Zorlu, 2004; year 1 is the year of arrival  
 
Of course, departure of immigrants differs by immigration motive and by country of origin. 
Among labour migrants (using entry cohort 1997), 62% had left within five years, while 
among refugees only 13% had left. Among immigrants motivated by family re-unification, 
19% has left within five years, while this is 16% for immigrants motivated by family 
formation (Hartog and Zorlu, 2004). Bijwaard (2007), applying a mover-stayer model and 
including repeat migration, estimates the long-run probability of ending up in The 
Netherlands, by motive and country of origin. For an unmarried male immigrant from an EU 
or EFTA country, the probabilities are 51% for labour migrants, 35 % for family reunion and 
74 % for family formation (Bijwaard excludes refugees). The percentages are substantially 
higher for married men and for women. By country of origin, variation is modest for family 
formation (mostly between 85 and 95%) and larger for labour  migrants (roughly between 57 
and 89%) and also larger for family re-union (roughly between 37 and 74%)  
While it is thus clear that a fair share of immigrants leave again after some time, we have no 
evidence on the selectivity of this process in The Netherlands. Constant and Massey survey 
the international literature and cite some European studies that suggest negative selection of 
return migration. In their own analysis of the first 14 years of the German SOEP panel 
igrants from the EU are more likely to return, that the  (started in 1984), they find that imm
return propensity is lower for the better integrated and for those who are fluent in German. 
They find no evidence of selectivity bias when estimating earnings functions corrected for 
selective emigration, but they do report that return migration is sensitive to employment: 
immigrants without a job are more likely to leave. There is also evidence of negative selection 
  8with respect to occupational prestige. The effect of extent of integration in German society 
and to fluency in German also suggests a relationship to initial qualities of immigrants, i.e. an 
ani, 30% for EU12 immigrants and just over 20% for 
s.  
rrection for unobserved heterogeneity differences 
ur migrant having already a job before arrival; non-
ion for work 
immediately upon arrival. They need some time to get full access to the labour market. The 
cond argument for the smooth transition of western immigrants to th arket refers 
to a high degree of skill transferability of these immigrants acquired in the home country and 
 s stern migrants may not be easily 
rian reasons may lack sufficient 
that h
endogeneity in relation to the original selection of immigrants; selectivity need not be entirely 
related to events that occur in Germany.   
Jensen and Pedersen (2007) study out-migration in Denmark. From the cohort of immigrants 
entering Denmark in 1984, some 80% of the Turks was still in the country after 10 years; this 
was just under 60% for Pakist
immigrants from other Nordic countries (o.c., Figure 2)
4. Rooth and Saarela (2007) analysed 
labour market outcomes for Finns in Sweden and found that return migration is not selective 
in unobserved skills relevant for earnings.  
Cross-section analysis may also provide biased estimates when immigrants and natives are 
asymmetrically influenced by business cycles. Chiswick et al. (1997) note the role of high 
unemployment at the time of entry and path dependence in the following years. Longva and 
Raaum (2002) show that labour market outcome for immigrants is more sensitive to a rise in 
unemployment than for native
Given our data, we cannot attempt any co
between entry cohorts and for possible selective return migration. Thus, we should be aware 
of potential bias in estimated effects of YSM. However, there is no unequivocal and 
compelling evidence that return migration in Europe is highly selective. Moreover, we believe 
that unobserved quality differences are more important when comparing immigrants from 
different source countries than when comparing different cohorts for the same source country 
and that consequently, the bias in estimating YSM effects need not be dramatic when we 
control for country of origin. 
5. Employment and unemployment  
Upon arrival in the Netherlands, non-western immigrants are less likely to be employed and if 
employed, they usually work in lower skilled jobs, compared to natives with comparable 
observed characteristics. On the other hand, the labour market performance of western 
immigrants does not much differ from that of natives. Differences in the initial position of 
these two immigrant groups can be attributed to two main reasons. The first one refers to 
different immigration policies for these groups. Western immigrants do not face any legal 
restriction and they enter usually as a labo
western immigrants may enter only on the basis of humanitarian reasons, as a family or 
asylum migrant. Correspondingly, non-western immigrants have often no permiss
se e labour m
selectivity of immigrants. On the other hand, kills of non-we
transferred, and immigrants entering on the basis of humanita
measured and unobserved qualifications.  
To model the progress of assimilation, we assume   t e probability of employment, as 
employee or self-employed, y, is captured by the following regression equation.  
                                                 
4 The authors analyse the propensity to leave within 10 years of arrival and find several statically significant 
results. But all these variables are endogenous and the result may well reflect reverse causality (as the authors 
themselves note: unemployment has a negative effect on the propensity to leave, but you can only have an 
unemployment record if you stay).  
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ge (with identical effect for natives and immigrants), SG is a dummy variable for 







) * (  (1) 
where A is a
d generation, YSM is the years since migration and M 
0 = YSM 6 immigrant groups. By construction,   for natives and for the second 
ren aged between 0 to 11 years).  
quation (1) has been fitted by standard probit models for the sub-samples of men and 
r of women is different from men. We present 
 the indicator 
foreign education into equivalent domestic scales, but we have no information on this. We 
have estimated the regression equation also including interaction variables of immigrant 
groups and education to check possible differences in values of education for immigrants 
                                                
generation. Edu is education (measured in years), X is other controls (marital status and the 
number of child
E
women separately, since participation behaviou
four models to facilitate understanding the role of education, varying assimilation patterns for 
immigrant groups and family status.
5  
Since migrants are more likely unemployed than natives, we also estimate unemployment 
probabilities by gender similar to the estimation procedure of employment probabilities to 
provide a more complete picture of the labour market. Unemployment probability U is 
defined as  
1 = U  if individual is a labour market participant and unemployed 
0 = U  if individual is employed       
Unemployment probabilities are separately estimated for men and women using the same 
equation (1).    
 
5.1 Estimates of employment probabilities 
In equation (1), the coefficients of YSM and YSM
2 measure how the native-immigrant 
employment gap diminishes as immigrants gain home-country specific experience, if no 
systematic changes have occurred in unobserved employment potential ε of successive 
immigration cohorts. Since YSM captures the assimilation effect over time,
variables for immigrant groups (M) reflect the initial employment gap of immigrants in the 
year of arrival relative to comparable natives. We test for different assimilation profiles by 
allowing interaction terms between YSM and M. Immigrants’ assimilation pattern can be 
affected by their education level already accomplished upon arrival and by later investments, 
but unfortunately, as in most studies, our data do not allow the distinction between education 
acquired abroad and education acquired domestically. The data collector possibly translated 
 
5 More recent studies proposed a family framework to analyse the labour supply of immigrant men and women 
since labour market decisions of spouses are interrelated. Baker and Benjamin (1997) argued that immigrant 
husbands work less than comparable natives after arrival in Canada while immigrant wives work more than 
natives to support their husbands’ investment in human capital. With assimilation, employment rates of 
immigrant husbands and wives will move towards these of native counterparts. Blau et al (2003) apply a similar 
framework and conclude that the wage rates and work hours of both immigrant men and women are less than for 
comparable natives upon arrival in the US but they increase with time to a similar extent. We plan a separate 
paper using the family framework.  
 
  10from various countries of origin. The interaction effects are not statistically significant
6, in 
contrast to our expectation that education acquired in many developing countries is not 
nd generation 
mployment increases at a decreasing 
te and reaches a maximum for men after 18 years
8, and 20.5 years when controlling for 
for the migrant groups, rather than assuming a common assimilation structure, the 
ssimilation r  t o
9 
els III a
urkey/Morocc th t a io n g  im t w sta  
employm b n r n n  
 we wil . a  
                    
equally evaluated in the labour market. So, perhaps this outcome indeed reflects a successful 
pre-translation of home country education into Dutch formal education scales.  
Table 3 shows the estimates of employment probabilities for men and women separately. 
Starting from Model I, Model 2 adds education, Model III differentiates assimilation profiles 
and Model IV adds family background, marital status and urbanisation. To facilitate 
interpretation, also marginal effects are presented; for dummy variables, this gives the 
percentage point difference in the employment probabilities of the dummied group and the 
reference category (natives). Adding seven education dummies to the regression (moving 
from Model I to Model II) has mostly negligible effect on the other coefficients; only for 
Turks and Moroccans there is a noticeable effect on the entry gap. 
The employment probability for men and women goes up with age, but at a decreasing rate. 
Assimilation profiles are also concave. As expected, individuals with a higher education level 
are more likely to be employed (not shown). The coefficients for the country of origin 
dummies give the initial employment gap of immigrants upon arrival. The entry gaps have the 
same ranking for men and for women. The gap is largest for refugees, the next group is non-
western, Turks/Moroccans, East Europeans and Caribbeans, with modest differences between 
them and the smallest gap, not surprisingly, is for western immigrants. Seco
immigrants do substantially better than first generation immigrants, but for men, the 
generation gap is never higher than the entry gap, implying that even second generation 
immigrants have a weaker labour market position. We have estimated second generation 
effects separately by origin country and found that the performance of the second generation 
Eastern European and other non-western immigrants (both men and women) is significantly 
better than for other origin groups (models with interaction terms are not shown here). 
However, allowing the second generation gap to vary by source country, we find that for men 
no entry gap is wiped out by the second generation gap; for women it is only wiped out for 
western immigrants. Hence, for essentially all source countries, second generation immigrants 
have poorer employment probabilities than native Dutch of similar qualities
7.   
The assimilation profile indicates that the probability of e
ra
education level, after 27 and 30 years for women. If we allow different assimilation patterns 
a ate is he highest f r refugees 
fo
who have a very high initial em
b
ployment gap
  (mod nd IV). They are  llowed  y non-western immigrants, immigrants from 


















y s l further ocus on ssimilat n pattern  Adding dditiona controls or famil
                                
6 With one except en  duc ibb  th tio me m 
educated Turks/Moroccans, and higher educated western), with lower employment). 
7 We estimate no second generation gap for refugees, for lack of observations.  
8 The maximum is calculated as a first order condition,
ion for m (higher e ated Car eans) and ree excep ns for wo n (mediu and higher 
  0 2 5 4 = + YSM β β , of the assimilation function 
) in the model I for men and women, for instance: 18=0.036/(2*0.001).  
9 The non-linear structure does not differ across the immigrant groups. Therefore a common quadratic term is 
maintained for all immigrants, interaction only affects the linear part of YSM. .  
(
2
5 4 YSM YSM β β +
  11background, ma a  b e o  
oth for men and women ere e  le.
able 3. Emplo ro es  co t,  al  nd ard    
M     W    
rital status and urb nisation arely aff cts the c efficients of other variables: 
b  the diff nces ar negligib   
 
T yment p babiliti , probit: efficien [margin effect] a  (stand  error).
  E N            O M E N        
  M M M M M M M M od I    od II    od III    od IV    od I    od II    od III    od IV   
Age    0.260  *** 0.265  *** 0.266*** 0.261*** 0.147*** 0.154*** 0.155  *** 0.159***
  [0.052]   [0.051]   [0.051] [0.049]  [0.053] [0.055] [0.056]   [0.057] 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) 
Age-sq  -0.003  *** -0.004  *** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002  *** -0.002***
  [-0.001]   [-0.001]   [-0.001] [-0.001]  [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001]   [-0.001] 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
YSM  0.036  *** 0.041  *** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.051  *** 0.054***
  [0.007]   [0.008]   [0.005] [0.005]  [0.020] [0.022] [0.018]   [0.019] 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) 
YSM-sq  -0.001  *** -0.001  *** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001  *** -0.001***
  [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
TurkMoroc  -1.471  *** -1.274  *** -1.070*** -1.074*** -1.965*** -1.676*** -1.535  *** -
-1.042  * -0.970 *  - -1.059 * -1.012 *  * 
[-0.323] [-0.289 [-0.403] [-0.387]
(0.029) (0.029 (0.021) (0.022)
-1.099  * -1.120 *  * * -1.094 * -1.184 *  * - *
[-0.348] [-0.349 [-0.414] [-0.444]
(0.031) (0.032 (0.019) (0.019)
-1.827  * -1.855 *  - -1.970 * -1.983 * 
[-0.621] [-0.626 [-0.610] [-0.616]
(0.025) (0.025 (0.012) (0.012)
-1.258  * -1.203 *  - -1.344 * -1.299 * 
[-0.409] [-0.380 [-0.489] [-0.479]
(0.027) (0.028 (0.015) (0.016)
-0.702  * -0.666 *  -0.956 * -1.011 *  -
[-0.189] [-0.172 [-0.367] [-0.386]
(0.021) (0.021 (0.019) (0.019)
econd  Gen  0.595  * 0.536 * 0.527 * 0.529 * 1.000 * 1.006 * 1.004 * 1.020 *
(0.006)  (0. (0. (0. (0. (0.
ribb*YSM  *  * 
     [0.003] [0.003]     [0.003]   [0.003] 
     (0.001) (0.001)     (0.002)   (0.002) 
Eas
  4] 
     (0.002)   (0.002) 
1.471***
  [-0.489]   [-0.406]   [-0.326] [-0.325]  [-0.618] [-0.572] [-0.541]   [-0.527] 
  (0.026)   (0.027)   (0.031) (0.031)  (0.009) (0.013) (0.018)   (0.020) 
Caribbean    **   ** -0.998*** 0.969*** ** ** -0.985  ** -0.996***
    ]   [-0.299] [-0.286]     [-0.378]   [-0.382] 
    )   (0.036) (0.036)     (0.027)   (0.028) 
East-Europ  **   ** -1.073** -1.063** ** ** -1.167  ** 1.256**
    ]   [-0.331] [-0.325]     [-0.438]   [-0.466] 
    )   (0.041) (0.041)     (0.024)   (0.023) 
RefugeeCount  **   ** -2.251*** 2.244*** ** ** -2.753  *** -2.770***
    ]   [-0.737] [-0.735]     [-0.671]   [-0.675] 
    )   (0.033) (0.034)     (0.007)   (0.007) 
Non-western  **   ** -1.379*** 1.364*** ** ** -1.364  *** -1.376***
    ]   [-0.450] [-0.442]     [-0.497]   [-0.501] 
    )   (0.034) (0.034)     (0.019)   (0.020) 
Western  **   ** -0.662*** -0.654*** ** ** -1.021  ***  1.042***
    ]   [-0.171] [-0.167]     [-0.390]   [-0.397] 
    )   (0.025) (0.025)     (0.022)   (0.022) 
S **     **   ** ** ** **     **   **
  [0.086]   [0.076]   [0.075] [0.075]  [0.269] [0.265] [0.265]   [0.266] 
   (0.007)    008)  007)  009)  009) (0.010)    010) 
Ca        0.015* 0.014*    0.009   0.009* 
   
   
tEur*YSM         0.009 0.009     0.008   0.011 
       [0.002] [0.002]     [0.003]   [0.00
       (0.001) (0.001) 
Refug*YSM         0.058*** 0.058***    0.093  ***  0.094***
         [0.011] [0.011]     [0.033]   [0.033] 
         (0.003) (0.003)     (0.007)   (0.007) 
Non-west*YSM         0.027*** 0.026***    0.015  **  0.016** 
         [0.005] [0.005]     [0.005]   [0.006] 
         (0.001) (0.001)     (0.002)   (0.002) 
West*YSM         0.013*** 0.013**     0.012  **  0.013***
         [0.003] [0.002]     [0.004]   [0.005] 
         (0.001) (0.001)     (0.001)   (0.001) 
                           
Log Likelihood  -24482   -23608   -23589 -23519 -40499 -38442  -38426   -37633
Pseudo R-sq  0.23   0.25   0.25 0.26 0.14 0.19  0.19   0.20
N  71445  71445  71445 71445 73644 73644  73644  73644
p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Model II and III also include dummies for 7 categories of educational achievement. Model IV additionally 
include 3 dummy variables for the presence of children below 11 years, controls for marital status, the 
degree of urbanisation and for naturalisation of immigrants. 
  12Above we noted that entry gaps do not differ by level of education. We have also tested for 
 age 
g 
e parabolic effect of age at immigration: immigrants arriving at age 35 start at higher 
mployment probability than immigrants arriving at age 25, but with entry at age 45, the 
employment probably appears to have fallen. There is a tendency to convergence, in the sense 
that the slope of the curve is higher for groups with larger gap at entry, as predicted by Duleep 
and Regets (1999). Men who enter at age 25 never fully close the gap, but some immigrant 
groups entering at age 35 do quite well. Western and Caribbean men reach up to parity with 
native men. Turkish and Moroccan men always remain behind and in fact loose more ground 
after 15 years. Immigrants from refugee countries have a striking speed of assimilation.  
The profiles for women show similar ranking by origin country as for men, but the differences 
between the groups are larger. Caribbean, East-European and non-western women do quite 
well, Turkish and Moroccan women have much lower employment probabilities throughout 
and remain far from parity with natives. Female refugees also catch up at an amazing speed. 
 
interaction between the effects of YSM and education. We found very modest effect for high 
educated immigrant men but no significant effect for immigrant women. This indicates that 
education generally has a negligible effect on assimilation: it affects neither the entry gap nor 
the assimilation profile!  This is certainly a remarkable conclusion, contrary to what one 
might have anticipated: one would expect the higher educated to benefit faster from the 
switch to a new country, to be better equipped to exploit the opportunities. As Figure 1 
indicates, the results can not be due to lack of variation in schooling levels: Sample sizes for 
some origin groups are small (e.g. only 285 female refugees), but generally, the sample sizes 
are large enough for education effect to show up. It seems then that the conclusion we found 
for refugees to the Netherlands (Hartog and Zorlu, forthcoming) generalizes: for immigrants, 
education is not the sure way to success!  
5.2 Simulations assimilation patterns 
Employment assimilation patterns for migrant men and women are simulated with the 
parameter estimates from equation (1). We put the other variables at their sample means and 
chose three levels of age.(Figure 2). We keep age constant for both natives and immigrants 
and thus the curves give the pure effect of catching up on the gap that exists at a given
during years since migration As the duration of residence is less than 15 years for most 
refugees, we have not extrapolated beyond 15 years for this group.Age and hence age at entry 
at entry has an impact on the patterns of assimilation, as the model is non-linear and 
employment probabilities are limited to the 0-1 interval. The effects are parabolic, reflectin
th
e
  13Figure 2. Probability of employment by years since migration, for different ages at arrival.  






































































































































































































5.3 Estimates of unemployment probabilities 
Table 4 displays native-immigrant unemployment differences and the impact of YSM on 
unemployment probabilities. Again, the differences between specifications are fairly modest, 
with one exception discussed below. The unemployment rates for male non-western 
immigrants upon arrival are 20 to 30 percentage points higher than for natives. For women 
these differences are no more than 8 to 15 percentage points, reflecting their much higher 
non-participation rates. The effect of arrival at higher age is positive at diminishing rate. 
Second generation immigrants also have higher unemployment, as the second generation 
dummy does not surpass the origin country dummies. Allowing the second generation effect 
to differ by origin country, we find that the immigrant disadvantage is only wiped out for the 
  14East European second generation; in all other cases we find that even second generation 
immigrants do worse than native born Dutch of similar observed quality. Adding some 
controls in specification IV (family situation, urbanisation) has little effect on other 
coefficients. The ranking by region of origin indicates three levels: the highest unemployment 
gap is for refugees, the lowest for western immigrants, the other countries are in between at 
fairly similar levels. The ranking for women is rather similar but at much smaller differences; 
for female refugees, the initial unemployment gap is replaced by an increasing gap over time. 
To allow differences for the second generation across the origin countries, we interacted the 
origin country fixed effects with the dummy for the second generation (models with these 
interactions not shown here). The interaction terms indicate much larger unemployment 
probabilities for the second generation Turkish and Moroccan men and women as well as the 
second generation women from Eastern Europe and Other non-western Europe, relative to the 
second generation Western immigrants. Additionally, we interact YSM with education to test 
the intuition that higher educated immigrants may benefit relatively more from a longer stay 
in the Netherlands. The results provide no indication for this proposition. As before, time 
rofiles are simulated for each origin group.  
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  M M M M M od I    od II    od III   od IV     od I    Mod II    Mod III    Mod IV  
Age    * * *  *  * 0.008   0.008   0.010 0.048** 0.074** 0.073** 0.074  ** 0.086**
  [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001] [0.005]  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]   [0.008] 




0.001)   (
0.000
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urkMoroc  * *  * * * *  *  *
aribbean  * *  * * * *  *  *
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efugeeCount  * *  * * * * 
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  [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Y -0.026 ** -0.027 ** -0.033** -0.032** -0.013 -0.014 -0.030  ** -0.035**
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0.021) (0.030)   (0.033) 
C ** ** 1.097** ** ** ** 0.677  ** 0.609**
  [0.218]   [0.213]   [0.235] [0.242]  [0.115] [0.110] [0.116]   [0.095] 
  (
0.913
0.035)   (
0.926






0.025) (0.030)   (0.028) 
E   **   ** 0.642** ** ** ** 0.703  ** 0.749**
  [0.179]   [0.182]   [0.105] [0.104]  [0.120] [0.117] [0.123]   [0.130] 
  (
1.347 
0.035)   (
1.348 






0.025) (0.031)   (
0.140
0.032) 
R ** ** 1.340** ** ** ** 0.024     
  [0.328]   [0.328]   [0.324] [0.326]  [0.104] [0.099] [0.003]   [0.015] 
  (
1.067 
0.040)   (
1.063 






0.032) (0.032)   (0.037) 
N ** ** 0.961** ** ** ** 0.453  ** 0.496**
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  15         [ [ [ [ 0.003]  0.003]          0.001]    0.001] 
         (0.001)  (0.001)          (0.001)    (0.001) 
Refug*YSM   
[ [ [0.009]  [
on-west*YSM
[ [ [0.002]  [
est*YSM 
    [0.001]  [0.001]        [0.001]  [0.001]
      (    
  Likelihood 
Pse     0.05 0.07   0.03 0.03   0.03   0.06 
N   37165 37165    38411 38411  38411   38411 
       0.008  0.007          0.086  ** 0.083* 
         0.001]  0.001]            0.008] 
         (0.002)  (0.002)          (0.003)    (0.003) 
N          0.015 0.022*           0.023  *  0.021* 
         0.002]  0.002]            0.002] 
         (0.001)  (0.001)          (0.001)    (0.001) 
W        0.008 0.012          0.013    0.014 
            
      (0.001) 0.001)       (0.001)    (0.001) 
                
Log -7445  -7423   -7417 -7208    -8090 -8051  -8045   -7850 
udo R-sq  0.04  0.05
37165  37165 
p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Model II and III also include dummies for 7 categories of edu
nclude 3 dummy variables for the presence of children below
cational achievement. Model IV additionally 
 11 years and controls for marital status, the 
egree of urbanisation and for naturalisation of immigrants. 
igration, among women it’s refugees and 
estern immigrants that have this deviant pattern.  





In figure 3 below, we graph the probability of unemployment in function of years since 
migration for an average immigrant: all other variables are set at their sample means for the 
relevant origin group. Again we see large differences between origin groups, with refugees 
doing worst and Turks/Moroccans doing remarkably well. The latter effect may be due to 
better alternatives: non-participation, disability benefit.  Men do not reach parity with natives, 
some women immigrant groups do (Caribbeans, Turks/Moroccans). Very remarkable is the 
difference in slopes of the profiles. Among men, East-Europeans and western men have 
unemployment rates increasing with years since m
w
 

































































































































6. Occupational structure 
Immigrants’ disadvantage is not limited to low labour market participation and high 
unemployment. It has been widely documented that the quality of jobs occupied by 
immigrants is usually relatively low. Since no direct measurement of job quality is available 
and no information on wages is included in the LFS, the quality of jobs will be approximated 
by the Erikson. Goldthorpe and Portocarero (EGP) social class scheme, which is regularly 
used by sociologists (Evans 1992). The EGP reflects various dimensions of job quality, like 
wages, skill requirements, employment status, power relations in production process, routines 
of tasks, promotion possibilities and career prospects. To assess the relative position of 
immigrants in occupational classes, we reorganise the original eleven categories of the EGP 
into three categories, referred to as 1: Service class (professionals and managerial jobs), 2: 
Intermediate jobs and 3: Working class (routine non-manual and semi- and unskilled manual 
jobs)
10.  
Table 5 shows the distribution of natives and immigrants across the occupational classes. 
Non-western immigrants are highly concentrated in the category working class jobs while the 
occupational distribution of western immigrants is closer to that of natives. Among 
immigrants, the categories TurkMoroc. Asylum and non-west migrants are overrepresented in 
working class jobs. Caribbean migrants have a better position than other non-western 
migrants. Native and western men have more likely service class jobs compared to their 
female  counterparts while the opposite holds for women from the other categories 
TurkMoroc, Asylum and Eastern-European.  
 
Table 5. Distribution of natives and immigrants 25-64 by job class. percentages (weighted) 
   Men        Women 
 Service  Interm Working Service Interm Working
Native 43.5  34.7 21.7 37.7 36.2 26.1
TurkMoroc 15.4  26.8 57.9 17.7 26.8 55.4
Caribbean 
pean 
30.7  34.8 34.6 31.4 32.3 36.3
East-Euro 25.5  41.8 32.7 28.7 28.7 42.6
Refugee 
-west 













     
34.0
       
35.3 23.6 37.2 27.6
                                                 
10 Professional and Managerial jobs refer to the categories I and II of Goldthorpe’s original eleven classes while 
Unskilled Jobs are captured by IIIb. VIIa and VIIb 
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The distribution of the employed labour force across these job categories is no doubt largely 
determined by individual background variables. To assess ethnic differences in the 
distribution, we study determinants of being in one of the three job types by regression 
models. We will not impose a strict ranking assumption on the job classes and model. The 
probability of being in one of the occupational classes as a multinomial choice process. The 
coefficients for reference outcome 3 (Working class jobs) are normalized to zero; thus, we 
estimate probabilities of having a service class or intermediate job, separate for men and 
women, relative to having a working class job.  
6.1 Results 
The estimates are presented in table 6a and 6b. It is immediately apparent that education level 
has a strong positive effect on the probability of having service and intermediate class jobs 
relative to working class jobs, as expected. Remarkably, immigrants are still significantly less 
likely in service and intermediate class jobs after controlling for age, education and family 
status. The initial probability of having service class jobs upon arrival is about 37 percentage 
points lower for immigrant men from Turkey/Morocco and East-Europe than for native men, 
as indicated by marginal effects for the origin fixed effects in model 4. Male immigrants from 
the Caribbean and Western source countries do experience an initial disadvantage of about 28 
percentage points relative to natives. This gap is the highest for Refugee men (43 percentage 
points). The initial gap for service class jobs is relatively smaller for immigrant women 
relative to native women and the variation between the origin groups is relatively small, 
ranging from 19 to 26 percentage points.  
The initial ethnic gap for intermediate jobs is relatively lower for immigrant men, compared 
to service class jobs: about 15 percentage points for Turks/Moroccans and 8-9 points for 
Caribbean, Eastern European and Western immigrants. However, it is relatively larger for 
immigrant women, varying from 22 to 29 percentage points. These ethnic gaps decline at a 
diminishing rate with additional year of residence (YSM). The decline is sharper for refugees 
as indicated by an interaction of the origin fixed effect with YSM. The probability of having 
service class and intermediate jobs will reach its maximum after circa 30 years of residence 
for immigrant men and 50 to 60 years of residence for immigrant women
11.  
Again, to test a possible variation in assimilation profiles of immigrants with different 
education level, we estimated models with interaction terms of origin countries and education, 
and alternatively interaction terms of YSM and education (not shown here). Similar to the 
analysis of (un)employment, value of education tends be lower for Turks/Moroccans and the 
group other non-western migrants. We found no evidence of a higher assimilation rate for 
higher educated immigrants. Medium educated migrants have even a less favorable 
assimilation profile relative to the lower educated. These results underline, once again, a 
limited relevance of education for migrants in employment assimilation.    
 
                                                 
11 These optimum values reflect the first order conditions, derived from the assimilation function 
), calculated using the estimated coefficients for YSM and YSM-squared ( (
2
5 4 YSM YSM β β + 4 β and  5 β ) in 
tables 6a and 6b, model 4 for immigrant men and women.  Note the maximum for refugee men will differ from 
other groups since the interaction term with YSM for this group is statistically significant. 
  18Table 6a. Determinants of Service and Intermediate Jobs; multinomial odds ratios, (standard 
errors) and [marginal effects], MEN  
  Service             Intermediate         
  Mod I    Mod II    Mod III    Mod IV      Mod I    Mod II    Mod III    Mod IV   
Age   1.122***  1.201***  1.203*** 1.130***   1.042*** 1.071*** 1.072*** 1.019 
 (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
 [0.022]  [0.033]  [0.034]  [0.027]   [-0.008] [-0.015] [-0.015] [-0.016] 
Age-sq 0.999***  0.998***  0.998*** 0.999***   0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 1.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [-0.000]  [-0.000]  [-0.000] [-0.000]   [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
YSM 1.030*  1.126***  1.122*** 1.113***   1.060*** 1.075*** 1.073*** 1.063***
 (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.021)   (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
 [-0.001]  [0.017]  [0.016]  [0.016]    [0.009] [-0.003] [-0.003] [-0.004] 
YSM-sq 1.000  0.998***  0.998*** 0.998***   0.999** 0.999** 0.999** 0.999** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.000]  [-0.000]  [-0.000] [-0.000]   [-0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
TurkMoroc 0.080***  0.034***  0.037*** 0.034***   0.143*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.146***
 (0.161)  (0.210)  (0.240)  (0.243)   (0.147) (0.157) (0.178) (0.180) 
 [-0.317]  [-0.379]  [-0.374] [-0.379]   [-0.186]  [-0.155] [-0.152] [-0.153] 
Caribbean 0.250***  0.093***  0.124*** 0.111***   0.264*** 0.217*** 0.264*** 0.251***
 (0.160)  (0.213)  (0.244)  (0.250)   (0.156) (0.165) (0.198) (0.202) 
 [-0.174]  [-0.300]  [-0.273] [-0.284]   [-0.131]  [-0.107] [-0.078] [-0.082] 
East-Europ 0.197***  0.035***  0.036*** 0.038***   0.311*** 0.185*** 0.186*** 0.199***
 (0.180)  (0.236)  (0.297)  (0.299)   (0.166) (0.175) (0.225) (0.227) 
 [-0.225]  [0.376]  [-0.374] [-0.373]   [-0.089]  [-0.115] [-0.115] [-0.099] 
RefugeeCount 0.123***  0.010***  0.003*** 0.003***  0.195*** 0.120*** 0.084*** 0.101***
 (0.222)  (0.284)  (0.584)  (0.591)   (0.194) (0.208) (0.432) (0.439) 
 [-0.274]  [-0.414]  [-0.429] [-0.429]   [-0.152]  [-0.185] [-0.233] [-0.206] 
Non-western 0.192***  0.045***  0.038*** 0.040***   0.250*** 0.195*** 0.168*** 0.188***
 (0.158)  (0.211)  (0.256)  (0.259)   (0.150) (0.160) (0.197) (0.200) 
 [-0.218]  [-0.363]  [-0.371] [-0.371]   [-0.127]  [-0.107] [-0.133] [-0.110] 
Western 0.416***  0.106***  0.102*** 0.104***  0.302*** 0.211*** 0.208*** 0.218***
 (0.136)  (0.183)  (0.202)  (0.206)   (0.134) (0.142) (0.163) (0.164) 
 [-0.072]  [-0.285]  [-0.290] [-0.289]   [-0.142]  [-0.105] [-0.105] [-0.096] 
Second Gen  3.264***  10.799***  10.969*** 10.576***  3.271*** 4.634*** 4.619*** 4.475***
 (0.139)  (0.185)  (0.200)  (0.203)   (0.136) (0.145)  (0.160) (0.161) 
 [0.083]  [0.277]  [0.281] [0.278]   [0.069] [-0.111] [-0.114]  [-0.115] 
Caribb*YSM         0.987 0.982           0.989 0.982 
         (0.013)  (0.013)         (0.010)  (0.010) 
         [-0.001]  [-0.001]          [-0.001]  [-0.001] 
EastEur*YSM        1.001  0.995          1.001  0.995 
         (0.022)  (0.022)         (0.016)  (0.017) 
         [0.000]  [-0.000]          [0.000]  [-0.000] 
Refug*YSM         1.143**  1.136*          1.039  1.030 
         (0.051)  (0.052)         (0.041)  (0.042) 
         [0.026]  [0.026]          [-0.013]  [-0.015] 
Non-west*YSM         1.019 1.010           1.013 1.002 
         (0.017)  (0.017)         (0.013)  (0.013) 
         [0.002]  [0.002]          [0.000]  [-0.001] 
West*YSM         1.012 1.011          1.004  1.002 
         (0.012)  (0.012)         (0.009)  (0.009) 
         [0.002]  [0.002]          [-0.001]  [-0.001] 
                  
Pseudo  R-sq  -62734 -48083  -48075 -47748              
Log  likelihood  0.01   0.24  0.24 0.25              
N  59430  59430 59430 59430              
p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Model II and III also include dummies for 7 categories of educational achievement. Model IV also includes 
3 dummy variables for the presence of children below 11 years and controls for marital status, the degree of 
urbanisation, naturalisation of immigrants and working hours. 
  19Table 6b. Determinants of Service and Intermediate Jobs; odds ratios, (standard errors) and 
[marginal effects], WOMEN  
  Service              Intermediate         
  Mod I    Mod II    Mod III    Mod IV      Mod I    Mod II    Mod III    Mod IV   
Age    0.935*** 0.991 0.991 1.072*** 0.974*  0.986  0.985  1.017 
  (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)    (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.013) 
 [-0.012]  [-0.000]  [0.000] [0.013]    [0.003]  [-0.002] [-0.002]  [-0.006] 
Age-sq  1.000*** 1.000 1.000 0.999**    1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [-0.000] [-0.000]    [-0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
YSM 1.041**  1.078***  1.095*** 1.091*** 1.060*** 1.065***  1.074***  1.072***
  (0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024)    (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)  (0.020) 
  [0.002] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009]    [0.008] [0.004] [0.004]  [0.004] 
YSM-sq  0.999  0.999* 0.999* 0.999    0.999* 0.999* 0.999 0.999 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
  [-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000]    [-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000]  [-0.000] 
TurkMoroc 0.088*** 0.117***  0.095*** 0.070*** 0.101*** 0.135***  0.117***  0.095***
  (0.184) (0.248) (0.289) (0.296)    (0.182) (0.201) (0.234)  (0.242) 
  [-0.269] [-0.221] [-0.239] [-0.256]    [-0.257] [-0.249] [-0.266]  [-0.293] 
Caribbean 0.287*** 0.183***  0.190*** 0.134*** 0.229*** 0.202***  0.201***  0.152***
  (0.165) (0.224) (0.251) (0.254)    (0.171) (0.187) (0.212)  (0.218) 
  [-0.134] [-0.176] [-0.171] [-0.200]    [-0.184] [-0.196] [-0.199]  [-0.236] 
East-Europ 0.267*** 0.069***  0.073*** 0.067*** 0.225*** 0.130***  0.142***  0.133***
  (0.163) (0.221) (0.268) (0.271)    (0.168) (0.180) (0.219)  (0.224) 
  [-0.147] [-0.269] [-0.267] [-0.265]    [-0.183] [-0.244] [-0.231]  [-0.243] 
RefugeeCount 0.450* 0.096***  0.131* 0.092**   0.264*** 0.151*** 0.133** 0.106***
  (0.318) (0.430) (0.845) (0.833)    (0.346) (0.367) (0.665)  (0.666) 
  [-0.055] [-0.243] [-0.207] [-0.234]    [-0.184] [-0.228] [-0.255]  [-0.283] 
Non-western 0.168*** 0.056***  0.059*** 0.050*** 0.171*** 0.127***  0.135***  0.120***
  (0.163) (0.223) (0.264) (0.267)    (0.164) (0.179) (0.213)  (0.218) 
  [-0.208] [-0.284] [-0.282] [-0.284]    [-0.207] [-0.244] [-0.236]  [-0.253] 
Western 0.400*** 0.164***  0.157*** 0.142*** 0.242*** 0.164*** 0.182***  0.163***
  (0.144) (0.197) (0.212) (0.215)    (0.152) (0.164) (0.179)  (0.184) 
  [-0.068] [-0.180] [-0.191] [-0.194]    [-0.194] [-0.223] [-0.203]  [-0.220] 
Second Gen  3.146*** 6.523***  6.785*** 6.607*** 4.438*** 5.996***  5.570***  5.764***
  (0.146) (0.200)  (0.210) (0.213)   (0.154)  (0.167)  (0.176)  (0.181) 
 [0.020]  [0.107]  [0.133] [0.113]    [0.173] [0.089] [0.062]  [0.074] 
Caribb*YSM        0.982  0.976          0.987  0.982 
        (0.016)  (0.016)          (0.013)  (0.013) 
        [-0.002]  [-0.003]          [-0.001]  [-0.001] 
EastEur*YSM        0.979  0.972          0.979  0.973 
        (0.022)  (0.022)          (0.017)  (0.018) 
        [-0.002]  [-0.002]          [-0.002]  [-0.002] 
Refug*YSM        0.960  0.972          0.998  1.001 
        (0.065)  (0.064)          (0.050)  (0.049) 
        [-0.009]  [-0.006]          [0.006]  [0.004] 
Non-west*YSM        0.981  0.973          0.983  0.972 
        (0.019)  (0.020)          (0.015)  (0.016) 
        [-0.002]  [-0.002]          [-0.001]  [-0.003] 
West*YSM        0.988  0.984          0.976*  0.973* 
        (0.014)  (0.015)          (0.012)  (0.012) 
        [0.001]  [0.001]          [-0.004]  [-0.004] 
                            
Log likelihood  -51840 -37874 -37869 -36726      
Pseudo R-sq  0.01 0.28 0.28 0.30      
N 48161 48161 48161 48161      
p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Model II and III also include dummies for 7 categories of educational achievement. Model IV also include 3 
dummy variables for the presence of children below 11 years and controls for marital status, the degree of 
urbanisation, naturalisation of immigrants and working hours. 
 
  206.2 Simulations 
With the results in Table 6 we have simulated the distribution of occupational quality over 
three levels (Figure 4). Not surprisingly, immigrants are concentrated at lower occupational 
levels. But remarkably, this holds for all immigrant groups, including those from western 
countries. In all cases, the excessive concentration in unskilled jobs, relative to natives, 
decreases over time, and is generally reduced to about half its original value in 15 years time 
(except for refugees). The excess concentration in unskilled jobs is markedly stronger for 
women than for men. None of the groups reaches parity in 15 years time and in that sense we 
can say that for none of these groups is there successful integration within a reasonable time 
span.  
 
Figure 4. Distribution of occupational quality: probability for natives minus probability of 
immigrant groups (source: Table 6)   
Predicted Native-migrant difference in the occupational 
attainment, 35 years old, MEN
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attainment, 35 years old, WOMEN
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7. Conclusions 
We have studied the position of immigrants in The Netherlands using a large cross- section 
dataset for 2004 and 2005. We measure the gap at entry between immigrants and natives for 
some socio-economic variables and we measure assimilation profiles in function of years 
since migration. While admittedly this assignment of differences between cohorts over time to 
longitudinal effects may be invalidated by unobserved quality differences and selective 
emigration we have given reasons not to worry too much about such bias. We find some usual 
and hence anticipated results, such as poor performance of immigrants from non-western 
countries (including poor results for the second generation) and much better performance of 
immigrants from western source countries. But we also report several novel and not fully 
anticipated results.  
The analysis has shown that non-western immigrants are substantially less likely employed. 
The employment level of western immigrants is quite close to that of natives. Among non-
western immigrants, the labour market position of immigrants from former colonies in the 
Caribbean (Surinam and Dutch Antilles) is the best despite the fact that these immigrants are 
still significantly disadvantaged compared to natives. The significant higher performance of 
women from this group is remarkable. The participation rate of non-western immigrants is 
still very low and they are employed in low quality jobs, conditional on the relevant 
characteristics observed. The probability of participation and employment as well as quality 
of jobs is low upon arrival but increases significantly with the duration of stay.  
As the working population is considered, the same disadvantaged immigrant groups are less 
likely in professional and managerial jobs and highly concentrated in semi and unskilled jobs. 
Immigrants start with a low-qualified job upon arrival and the quality of job significantly goes 
up with the time elapsed in the Netherlands although the final position remains lower than for 
natives.  
Comparing with native gender counterparts, immigrant men are in general relatively more 
disadvantaged than immigrant women. Only among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, the 
active participation rate of women is relatively low. Especially immigrant men from Iran, Iraq 
and Afghanistan, who likely entered as asylum seekers, are less likely active in the labour 
market. Their low participation rate is possibly related to their particular position. During 
their asylum application, they are not allowed to work. However, high unemployment and low 
job quality can indicate a difficult starting position due to depreciation of their human capital 
endowment during the forced idleness (Hartog and Zorlu 2007).  
Comparing immigrant groups, we found that in terms of employment probability, 
Turks/Moroccans perform worst, Caribbeans and western men perform best We find support 
for the Duleep-Regets hypothesis of a negative relationship between dip and catch-up. The 
bigger the initial employment gap for an origin group, the steeper the effect of years since 
migration: employment probabilities converge over time. Also, convergence appears stronger 
for men than for women. Unemployment probabilities do not develop uniformly with time 
since migration: they generally decrease and approach levels for natives, but they increase for 
western immigrants, for East European men and for refugee women.  
We have also considered assimilation in terms of type of jobs. The gap in occupational quality 
between natives and immigrants appears larger for women than for men. Just like all other 
immigrant groups, immigrants from western countries are more likely to work in unskilled 
jobs than natives (even when controlling for education!).  
  22As our most remarkable result, we note that controlling for education has no effect on the 
entry gap in employment and on the unemployment probability. Also, controlling for 
education has no effect on the assimilation profile: the effect of years since migration on 
employment and unemployment is not sensitive to years of education. We find (but did not 
report) the same results if we suppress country of origin, hence country of origin does not 
absorb some possible interaction effects of education. This is a most unexpected result. 
Education appears to be impotent in affecting the position of immigrants! 
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Predicted probabilities EGP, men 
     SERVICE        LOW     
   Low Med High Total Low Med High  Total
 Native  0.13 0.28 0.85 0.43 0.54 0.18 0.03  0.22
TurkMoroc  YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.00 0.03 0.45 0.09 0.95 0.72 0.37 0.73
 YSM;  3-4  yrs 0.01 0.05 0.54 0.12 0.91 0.63 0.28  0.69
 YSM;  5-6  yrs 0.01 0.06 0.59 0.20 0.91 0.59 0.22  0.55
 YSM;  7-9  yrs 0.01 0.08 0.62 0.11 0.89 0.55 0.20  0.65
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.02 0.12 0.65 0.12 0.86 0.47 0.14  0.61
 YSM;  15-20  yrs  0.02 0.14 0.67 0.14 0.82 0.44 0.12  0.57
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.03 0.16 0.67 0.14 0.78 0.36 0.11  0.56
 Second  Gen. 0.05 0.14 0.68 0.26 0.69 0.31 0.09 0.36
 Total  0.03 0.13 0.65 0.16 0.81 0.43 0.14  0.55
Carrib  YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.00 0.10 0.72 0.23 0.97 0.54 0.13 0.54
 YSM;  3-4  yrs 0.02 0.15 0.33 0.12 0.86 0.40 0.44  0.55
 YSM;  5-6  yrs 0.03 0.12 0.62 0.15 0.79 0.44 0.12  0.49
 YSM;  7-9  yrs 0.04 0.14 0.70 0.22 0.79 0.41 0.10  0.48
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.05 0.18 0.76 0.26 0.75 0.36 0.07  0.40
 YSM;  15-20  yrs  0.07 0.19 0.77 0.30 0.69 0.30 0.06  0.33
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.11 0.27 0.80 0.33 0.61 0.23 0.04  0.31
 Second  Gen. 0.11 0.26 0.83 0.39 0.60 0.22 0.04 0.26
 Total  0.09 0.23 0.80 0.33 0.65 0.27 0.05  0.33
East-Eur  YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.00 0.04 0.64 0.12 0.97 0.59 0.19 0.59
 YSM;  3-4  yrs 0.01 0.04 0.55 0.24 0.88 0.63 0.24  0.49
 YSM;  5-6  yrs 0.01 0.05 0.62 0.23 0.88 0.55 0.16  0.46
 YSM;  7-9  yrs 0.01 0.08 0.63 0.24 0.89 0.49 0.17  0.41
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.02 0.09 0.71 0.21 0.80 0.45 0.12  0.40
 YSM;  15-20  yrs  0.03 0.10 0.65 0.28 0.79 0.38 0.11  0.34
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.06 0.13 0.75 0.29 0.65 0.30 0.06  0.25
 Second  Gen. 0.06 0.15 0.70 0.30 0.59 0.25 0.06 0.30
 Total  0.05 0.10 0.68 0.25 0.67 0.41 0.11  0.36
Refugee  YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.00    0.00  0.89    0.89
 YSM;  3-4  yrs 0.00 0.02 0.42 0.15 0.93 0.70 0.32  0.67
 YSM;  5-6  yrs 0.00 0.03 0.36 0.15 0.93 0.62 0.39  0.64
 YSM;  7-9  yrs 0.00 0.03 0.44 0.16 0.90 0.64 0.30  0.57
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.01 0.04 0.43 0.16 0.85 0.56 0.29  0.51
 Total  0.00 0.04 0.45 0.18 0.89 0.59 0.28  0.53
NW  YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.01 0.05 0.50 0.15 0.91 0.66 0.28 0.61
 YSM;  3-4  yrs 0.01 0.08 0.61 0.23 0.89 0.56 0.20  0.50
 YSM;  5-6  yrs 0.01 0.09 0.71 0.20 0.88 0.53 0.13  0.52
 YSM;  7-9  yrs 0.01 0.11 0.70 0.22 0.84 0.47 0.13  0.47
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.02 0.12 0.70 0.21 0.80 0.43 0.12  0.48
 YSM;  15-20  yrs  0.03 0.15 0.75 0.22 0.76 0.34 0.07  0.41
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.05 0.19 0.76 0.28 0.68 0.25 0.05  0.33
 Second  Gen. 0.09 0.17 0.78 0.43 0.57 0.26 0.05 0.22
 Total  0.04 0.14 0.73 0.26 0.75 0.38 0.09  0.40
West  YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.04 0.10 0.76 0.38 0.85 0.57 0.12 0.39
 YSM;  3-4  yrs 0.02 0.11 0.83 0.35 0.87 0.52 0.08  0.39
 YSM;  5-6  yrs 0.03 0.14 0.82 0.48 0.83 0.46 0.08  0.30
 YSM;  7-9  yrs 0.05 0.17 0.81 0.44 0.79 0.40 0.07  0.28
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.06 0.21 0.84 0.42 0.74 0.36 0.05  0.29
 YSM;  15-20  yrs  0.12 0.25 0.87 0.50 0.65 0.31 0.04  0.22
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.11 0.30 0.86 0.43 0.63 0.23 0.03  0.26
 Second  Gen. 0.16 0.33 0.88 0.50 0.52 0.17 0.02 0.19
 Total  0.15 0.30 0.87 0.49 0.54 0.22 0.03  0.21
 
  25Predicted probabilities EGP, Women 
     SERVICE       LOW    
   Low  Med High Total Low Med High  Total
 Native  0.08  0.20 0.80 0.37 0.70 0.20 0.03  0.26
TurkMoroc  YSM  up to 2 yrs 0.00  0.03  0.02  0.98 0.77 0.88
 YSM;  3-4  yrs   0.07 0.72 0.35   0.71 0.17  0.48
 YSM;  5-6  yrs  0.01  0.08 0.04  0.96 0.61  0.83
 YSM;  7-9  yrs  0.02  0.12 0.84 0.13 0.93 0.54 0.06  0.70
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.02  0.12 0.78 0.14 0.92 0.52 0.09  0.66
 YSM;  15-20  yrs  0.03  0.12 0.75 0.13 0.90 0.49 0.09  0.69
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.04  0.15 0.80 0.15 0.87 0.41 0.06  0.61
 Second  Gen.  0.06  0.18 0.79 0.28 0.74 0.21 0.04 0.31
 Total  0.04  0.15 0.78 0.19 0.87 0.37 0.06  0.54
Carrib  YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.02  0.20 0.52 0.19 0.94 0.40 0.32 0.65
 YSM;  3-4  yrs  0.04  0.10 0.80 0.15 0.88 0.56 0.06  0.64
 YSM;  5-6  yrs  0.03  0.14 0.70 0.32 0.89 0.42 0.14  0.42
 YSM;  7-9  yrs  0.03  0.17 0.71 0.25 0.89 0.40 0.12  0.47
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.04  0.17 0.76 0.28 0.86 0.37 0.08  0.42
 YSM;  15-20  yrs  0.05  0.16 0.77 0.27 0.82 0.36 0.07  0.39
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.06  0.20 0.78 0.29 0.81 0.30 0.06  0.41
 Second  Gen.  0.11  0.21 0.80 0.41 0.64 0.17 0.03 0.20
 Total  0.06  0.19 0.78 0.31 0.79 0.29 0.06  0.36
East-Eur  YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.01 0.06 0.51 0.21  0.95 0.63 0.35 0.56
 YSM;  3-4  yrs  0.01  0.07 0.63 0.32 0.95 0.61 0.22  0.45
 YSM;  5-6  yrs  0.01  0.09 0.68 0.34 0.94 0.54 0.17  0.42
 YSM;  7-9  yrs  0.01  0.08 0.67 0.27 0.94 0.56 0.16  0.45
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.01  0.09 0.67 0.28 0.93 0.53 0.16  0.44
 YSM;  0.12 
0.84
0.72 0.30
Total  0.03 
 
15-20  yrs  0.01  0.11 0.73 0.19 0.93 0.45 0.43
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.03  0.11 0.73 0.32  0.45 0.09  0.40
 Second  Gen.  0.04  0.12  0.78 0.26 0.05 0.31
  0.09 0.68 0.29 0.86 0.49 0.15  0.42
Refugee  YSM  up to 2 yrs                 
 YSM;  3-4  yrs   0.13  0.13    0.45  0.45
 YSM;  5-6  yrs   0.09 0.74
YSM;  7-9  yrs  0.01 0.63 0.42
YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.13 0.45
Total  0.13 0.39  0.45 0.34
NW  0.01  0.04
0.31   0.55 0.13  0.41
  0.12 0.30 0.97 0.48 0.21 
  0.02 0.78 0.41 0.90 0.09  0.35
  0.03 0.72 0.88 0.13 
YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.55 0.18 0.97 0.72 0.29 0.66
 YSM;  3-4  yrs  0.58
YSM;  5-6  yrs  0.06 0.94 0.62 0.59
 YSM;  0.17 0.57 0.57
 YSM;  0.02  0.09 0.19 0.91 0.17 
 YSM;  0.53
0.89 0.43 0.46
  0.69 0.37 0.69 0.07 
0.02  0.23 0.90
West    0.77 0.58 0.14 
0.01  0.05 0.55 0.23 0.97 0.65 0.30 
  0.01 0.58 0.20  0.26 
7-9  yrs  0.01  0.07 0.59  0.94 0.23 
10-14  yrs  0.65 0.52 0.55
15-20  yrs  0.02  0.09 0.64 0.17 0.90 0.47 0.14 
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.02  0.10 0.66 0.24  0.13 
Second  Gen.  0.06  0.10 0.29 0.22
 Total  0.08 0.64 0.49 0.16  0.49
YSM  up to 2 yrs  0.12 0.47   0.34
 YSM;  3-4  yrs  0.02  0.15 0.80 0.36 0.94
0.80 0.44 0.85 0.09 
YSM;  7-9  yrs  0.03 0.82
0.04 0.82 0.42 0.07 
YSM;  15-20  yrs  0.19 0.40 
0.83
Second  Gen.  0.09 0.81 0.25
Total  0.20 0.26
0.50 0.10  0.42
 YSM;  5-6  yrs  0.05  0.18 0.45 0.31
  0.15 0.42 0.88 0.46 0.08  0.33
 YSM;  10-14  yrs  0.17 0.39 0.88 0.32
  0.03 0.82 0.90 0.40 0.07  0.32
  YSM 20 + yrs  0.06  0.20 0.34 0.83 0.34 0.06  0.37
  0.21 0.40 0.69 0.20 0.03 
  0.09 0.82 0.39 0.71 0.04  0.27
 
  26